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CASE NO. 40886-2013 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BARRY McHUGH 
KOOTENAI COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
ONE BLUE 2007 TOYOTA FJ CRUISER, VIN NO. JTEBUIIF470014172, 
AND ONE THOUSAND, SEVEN HUNDRED DOLLARS AND 
ZERO CENTS ($1,700.00) OF LAWFUL US CURRENCY 
Defendant-Appellant. 
DEFENDANT -APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the First 
Judicial District for Kootenai County 
Kootenai County Case No. CV -12-00672 
(Honorable Benjamin Simpson, District Judge) 
NICOLAS V. VIETH 
Bar Nos. ID 8166 / WA 34196 
VIETH LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
912 East Sherman Avenue 
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INTRODUCTION 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Reids (hereinafter "Claimants") do not appeal the Stipulated Judgment of 
Forfeiture as Respondents suggest. Brief of Respondent, p. 1. Claimants appeal the 
Partial Summary Judgment entered by the district court on January 9th, 2013, in 
which the Honorable Benjamin Simpson awarded Respondent "Judgment of 
Forfeiture against any interest of Claimants Jeffrey A. Reid and Sandra M. Snyder-
Reid in one blue 2007 Toyota FJ Cruiser, VIN No. JTEBUIIF470014172[.]" R. Vol. 
1, p. 228. 
On January 9th, 2013 the district court granted the State's motion for summary 
judgment insofar as it requested forfeiture of the Claimants' vehicle; the court 
simultaneously denied the portion of the State's motion which requested forfeiture of 
$1,700. R. Vol. 1, p. 220-21. Subsequent to this, the State argued for costs 
associated with the summary judgment motion, and ultimately the parties agreed to 
drop all remaining claims and motions against one another, and entered into a 






A. CLAIMANTS DO NOT APPEAL THE JUDGEMENT ENTERED BY 
CONSENT OF THE PARTIES AND THUS ARE NOT PRECLUDED 
FROM EXERCISING THEIR RIGHT TO APPEAL. 
Claimants do not appeal the judgment entered by consent of the parties and 
thus are not precluded from exercising their right to appeal. The State mistakenly 
assumes that the present appeal is in regard to the Stipulated Judgment of Forfeiture 
entered on February 21,2013. R. Vol. 1, p. 255. Contrary to this assumption, 
Claimants have made clear that they appeal the Partial Summary Judgment that 
occurred nearly a month and a half earlier on January 9th, 2013. R. Vol. 1, p. 228; 
Defendant-Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 12, 20 (explaining that "the district court 
erred by granting partial summary judgment"). 
As authority for its position, the State cites Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis 
Ry. v. United States, 113 U.S. 261 (1885), which states: "a decree, which appears by 
the record to be rendered by consent, is always affirmed" and is not subject to appeal. 
Brief of Respondent, p. 5 (emphasis added). Notably, the Partial Summary Judgment 
that is the subject of this appeal could not have conceivably been rendered by 
consent by virtue of the fact that it was the result of a contested motion. See R. Vol. 
1, p. 198 (Objection to State's Motion for Summary Judgment). 
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Directly on point is Taylor Brands, LLC v. GB II Corp., 627 F.3d 874 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010). In Taylor the district court granted respondent's motion for summary 
judgment, finding that appellee did not infringe respondent's patent. Id at 875-76. 
Thereafter, the parties stipulated to a final judgment discharging their remaining 
claims. Id at 876. The stipulated judgment included the language of the summary 
judgment order, reading: "with the parties' consent, it is hereby ordered and adjudged 
that: a) Defendant has not infringed U.S. Patent No. 6,651,344 ... " Id emphasis in 
original). The party losing the summary judgment motion thereafter appealed the 
summary judgment decision. Id. 
Just as the State argues in the case before this Court, the respondent in Taylor 
argued that the appellee had waived its right to appeal due to signing a stipulated 
judgment containing the same language as the interlocutory summary judgment order. 
Id at 877. In rejecting this position, the court explained: 
Of course, the fact that some collateral issues were not resolved by a 
dispositive interlocutory order indicates that [appellant] consented to the 
substance of the judgment to the extent that it extended beyond carrying the 
summary judgment order into effect. [Appellant] has thus waived its right to 
contest any such collateral issues on appeal by failing to expressly reserve that 
right. However, because [appellant} clearly consented to only the form of the 
judgment insofar as it effectuates the summary judgment order, [appellant} has 
not waived its right to appeal the summary judgment order itself or any issues 
addressed therein .... 
Id at 879 (emphasis added). In coming to this conclusion, the court in Taylor relied 
on the Supreme Court of the United States' decision in Thomsen v. Cayser, stating 
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that this case stood for the proposition that "stipulated judgments do not bar an appeal 
of the underlying judgment." Id at 877 (citing Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 83 
(1917)). 
Because Claimants have unequivocally made clear that they are appealing the 
summary judgment order which forfeited the vehicle to the State "against any interest 
of Claimants Jeffrey A. Reid and Sandra M. Snyder-Reid in one blue 2007 Toyota FJ 
Cruiser, VIN No. JTEBU11F470014172", and not the stipulated judgment, Claimants 
have not waived their right to appeal. R. Vol. 1, p. 228. 
B. RESPONDENT NEGLECTS TO REBUT A MULTITUDE OF FACTS 
THAT WERE BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT AND 
MISREPRESENTS THE AVAILABILITY OF EVIDENCE FOR 
EXCESSIVE FINES ANALYSIS. 
Respondent neglects to rebut a multitude of facts that were before the district 
court, and misrepresents the availability of evidence for an excessive fines analysis. 
Among the facts available to the district court are the Reids' charges, guilty pleas, and 
sentences for the connected criminal cases. R. Vol. 1, pp. 130, 143. Further, the 
court was presented with their motives in committing their crimes, R. Vol. 1, p. 108 
para. 26. The Reids also specifically laid out the hardship they experience because of 
the loss of this vehicle, R. Vol. 1, p. 162, and the monetary burden this loss has 
continued to impose. R. Vol. 1, p. 176. 
Beyond the presence of these facts, the absence of facts similarly informs 
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excessive fines analysis. Specifically, the Reids are not purported to be drug dealers, 
gang members, or violent individuals. They do not derive a profit from their 
involvement with marijuana, nor do they involve anyone in the outside community 
with their marijuana affairs. 
As Respondent aptly points out, the excessive fines analysis is comprised of 
many, many factors, and the suggested "value" of the vehicle is not solely an 
evaluation of its monetary worth. Brief of Respondent, p. 9. Claimants raised the 
issue of excessive fines analysis in the case below and made the court aware of 
significant evidence to support a denial of summary judgment with regard to this 
issue. It is now seasonable for this Court to review whether the district court's 
determination was appropriate in light of this evidence. 
C. RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES. 
Interestingly, Respondent vehemently denies that Claimant's adverse party in 
this case can be properly characterized as "the State." Brief of Respondent, p. 2, n. 4. 
Then, Respondent goes on to argue that because the Kootenai County Prosecuting 
Attorney's office filed the complaint, that makes the "state agency or political 
subdivision" a party to the case, as required for an award of attorney's fees under 
Idaho Code § 12-117(1). Brief of Respondent, p. 15. The Prosecutor's Office is no 
more a party to this appeal than is counsel for Claimants. 
In addition to this inconsistency, Respondent similarly fails to establish that 
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Claimant's acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact. The statute requires the 
"losing party to have acted frivolously or without foundation before fees may be 
awarded." City o/Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906,910,277 P.3d 353,357 (2012). 
Quite the contrary, Claimants have presented this court with ample evidence 
supporting their position and a significant volume of authority challenging the 
Respondent's position. See generally Defendant-Appellant's Opening Brief. 
CONCLUSION 
Claimants have not waived their ability to appeal the partial summary judgment 
entered by the district court; there are a plethora of facts established in the record 
from which this Court will find that the forfeiture of the Claimants' vehicle is 
excessive; and Claimants do not bring the current appeal without basis in law or fact, 
and the State should not be awarded attorney's fees. For the above mentioned, it is 
therefore requested that this court reverse the district court's partial summary 
judgment. 
DATED this l~ day of September, 2013. 
VIETH LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
/)to---.. -
NICOLAS V. VIETH 
Attorney for Jeffrey Reid 
and Sandra Snyder-Reid 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
:J-S 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ay of September, 2013, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document was served upon the following by the method 
indicated: 
Jamila Holmes 
Civil Deputy Prosecutor 
PO Box C9000 
Coeur d' Alene ID 83816-9000 
Sheryl S. Phillabaum 
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews 
& Sheldon, PLLC 
1235 North Post Street, Suite 100 
Spokane W A 99201 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
__ Facsimile (208-446-1621) 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivery 
~ Overnight Mail 
__ Facsimile (509-625-1909) 
~V_VIETH 
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